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Abstract  
Based on existing evidence, we know little about how the taxation of small 
business owners affects their economic activity. This paper studies the effect of 
two Finnish tax reforms, in 1997 and 1998, on the effort decisions of the owners 
of small businesses, utilizing both theoretical model and empirical data. The 
reforms reduced the income tax rates of small business owners and applied only 
to unincorporated firms, leaving out corporations. We use a difference-
indifferences strategy to estimate the causal impact of tax incentives on the 
economic activity of small businesses. The results imply that lighter taxation 
leads to an increase in the turnover of firms that we interpret as an increase in 
effort exerted by their owners. 
Key words: Entrepreneurs, small businesses, tax incidence 
JEL classification numbers: H25, H24, H22 
Tiivistelmä 
Olemassa olevan tiedon perusteella emme tiedä tarpeeksi siitä, miten pienyritys-
ten omistajien verotus vaikuttaa heidän taloudelliseen käyttäytymiseensä. Tämä 
artikkeli tutkii vuosina 1997 ja 1998 Suomessa tapahtuneiden veronmuutoksen 
vaikutuksia pienten yritysten omistajien yritteliäisyyteen. Hyödynnämme tutki-
muksessamme sekä teoreettista mallia että empiiristä aineistoa. Mainitut veron-
muutokset vähensivät pienten yritysten omistajien tuloverotaakkaa ja vaikuttivat 
henkilöyhtiöihin mutta eivät osakeyhtiöiden omistajiin. Käytämme muutosten 
väliset erot -menetelmää selvittääksemme verokannusteiden kausaalivaikutuksen 
pienten yritysten omistajien käyttäytymiseen. Tulokset viittaavat siihen, että 
omistajan keveämpi tuloverotus johtaa pieneen lisäykseen hänen yrityksensä 
liikevaihdossa. Tulkitsemme analyysimme perusteella tämän johtuvan yrittäjän 
yritteliäisyyden lisäyksestä.  
Avainsanat: Yrittäjät, pienet yritykset, veron kohtaanto 
1 Introduction
Small businesses are seen as one key source of economic growth. For this
reason, myriad economic policies have been devoted to promote the economic
activity within small businesses (Buss 2001). Various theories exist about
what kind of activity in small businesses leads to greater growth ranging from
the risk-taking opportunities of entrepreneurs (Cullen and Gordon, 2007)
to maintaining external funds (Carpenter and Petersen, 2002). This paper
argues that one important channel for increased output in small firms is the
activity of the owner. This activity can be promoted or hindered through
taxation in a way similar to the labor effort of employees. We establish this
in a theoretical model and study empirically to what extent the income tax
burden on entrepreneurs affects the output of their firms.
We are interested in the determinants of the real economic activity of
entrepreneurs. One real economic activity is the effort decision of an en-
trepreneur. Earlier literature has established that the effect of the tax system
on this decision is ambiguous (Carroll et al. 2001) and depends on the type
of entrepreneur and opportunities (Kanniainen et al. 2007). We build a sim-
ple theoretical model that explores this in an intertemporal framework. In
the model it is essential that an entrepreneur can affect her own tax burden
and consumption opportunities either through increasing effort or shifting
assets from one period to another. The former is purely a real economic
decision that entails a utility cost, while the latter also affects the timing
of lifetime consumption opportunities. Shifting assets could also be seen as
tax-planning. We argue that in this environment more leniently taxed in-
come from the firm can either increase or decrease the effort exerted by an
entrepreneur. The direction of this effect depends on how forward-looking
the entrepreneur is.
Empirically, it is challenging to analyze the causal effect of taxation on any
firm-level outcomes. We contribute to this by analyzing two Finnish reforms
that typically reduced the income tax burden of owners of unincorporated
firms but did not change the tax system for incorporated firms.1 The reforms
1The reform and tax incentive changes are previously discussed in Kari et al. (1998).
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altered a predetermined capital income imputation rule. By exploiting this
feature, we are able to construct an exogenous measure for each firm that
describes the change in the tax burden of the owner of the firm due to the
reforms. These reforms allow us to apply a natural experimental approach
where we compare the outcomes of unincorporated firms before and after the
reforms with the outcomes of incorporated firms. As a result, we can control
for unobserved changes in these outcomes by comparing treated firms with
similar control firms, which only differ in their legal form. We demonstrate
that the two groups develop in a similar manner over time, except for the
reform period.
Our second contribution is a solution to the problem of observing the
actual economic activity of an entrepreneur. We have access to firm-level tax
record data that include the turnover of firms. We argue that an increase
in the turnover, which is the output value of a firm, is an indication of
increased economic activity. In a small firm, an increase in the output could
come from entrepreneur’s increased effort or increased input use, like labour
or investments. We estimate how the reform affected all of these. Thus we
can allocate the effects of the income taxation of owners to either the effort
decisions or input use.
The results indicate that decreasing the marginal tax rate of an en-
trepreneur increases the turnover of her firm. Our main specification that
compares partnerships with corporations indicates that a 10 per cent reduc-
tion in the marginal tax rate leads to a 1.7 per cent increase in turnover.2 We
also study heterogeneous effects by the size of the change in tax incentives
and pre-reform income. We find that the larger was the change in incentives
or pre-reform income, the larger was the response in turnover. We do not
find any significant effects on the input use of the affected firms. Wage sums
increase, but there is no indication that more people are being employed.
Thus it seems that the reforms did not increase labor demand. Moreover we
do not find any statistically significant increase in investments. Therefore the
2Sole proprietors were also in the treatment group, but empirically their tax incentives
did not change much, and correspondingly their turnover did not seem to react to the
reform.
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increase in turnover is due to an increase in effort that the entrepreneurs ex-
ert. Our main results pass various robustness checks, for example to take into
account the extensive margin decisions of exit and entry, or to instrument
the dependent variable.
Apart from increasing their output, a real economic activity, entrepreneurs
could respond by tax-planning. In the tax system that we study an indica-
tion of tax planning would be to arrange accounts in a fashion that increases
profits, or change net assets or the wage sum in a firm in response to tax in-
centives. For example, Sivadasan and Slemrod (2008) study income shifting
within firms in India. They use a set-up similar to ours, where they compare
partnerships in the treatment group with corporations in the control group.
They find that firms responded to changed tax incentives by shifting income
from profits to wages. We find an indication that the income from the firm
increased, but not necessarily more than the output of the firm. We do find
that wage sums increase like Sivadasan and Slemrod (2008), which would
indicate tax planning if entrepreneurs paid more wages to themselves. Firms
also increase their assets, which reduces their marginal tax rate in future.
Another indication of tax planning is that more firms choose legal forms
that are more leniently taxed (Gordon and Mackie-Mason 1994, Mackie-
Mason and Gordon 1997, Goolsbee 1998b and 2004). We study how tax
reforms affect the switching of legal forms. We find that more lenient tax-
ation of partnerships makes switching from partnerships to corporations a
statistically significantly less common phenomenon.
Earlier literature has established that more progressive income taxation
reduces the willingness to take risk, thus leading to less entrepreneurial activ-
ity (Kerr and Nanda 2009) and lower economic growth (Cullen and Gordon
2007). We do find that the reforms affected the extensive margin decisions,
exit, entry and switching legal form. We think that our results complement
the picture of the literature focusing on extensive margin responses by show-
ing that both margins of response, extensive and intensive, can be important
at the same time.
We also contribute to the literature studying policies that directly aim
to boost employment. The 1997 reform added part of the wage sum to an
3
imputed income rule, where capital income from the firm is imputed. Thus
income taxation of the owner of the firm shrank more the higher was the
wage sum in the firm. Earlier papers have analyzed policies where payroll
taxes are reduced, and which have a similar effect on labour costs as the wage
sum rule in the 1997 reform. The results indicate that employment increased
only very modestly, if at all (Korkeamäki and Uusitalo 2009). Bennmarker
et al. (2009) found that wages increased as a result of the abolition of payroll
tax, but employment did not. This is in line with our result. In contrast,
Duranton et al. (2011) find that increases in local tax rates can reduce the
labor demand of firms.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: section 2 presents the macroe-
conomic conditions at the time of the reforms, describes the institutional
aspects of firm taxation and presents a theoretical model that describes how
an entrepreneur responds to changes in tax incentives. Section 3 presents
the econometric specification and discusses identification issues. Section 4
presents the data and descriptive statistics derived from them. Section 5
presents the results and robustness checks. Section 6 concludes the study.
2 Economic conditions and institutions
2.1 Macroeconomic situation surrounding the reforms
The mid-1990s were a period of economic growth in most developed countries.
This is true for Finland as well, but the deep recession between 1991 and 1993
makes the Finnish situation particular. However, the economy was already
recovering from it in 1997, when the first reform we study took place.
The severity of the recession and the subsequent growth can be seen
from figure 1, where the development of Finnish GDP per capita and the
unemployment rate is compared with neighboring Sweden and the OECD
average. The vertical line marks the year 1997, when the first reform took
place. In the early 1990s in Finland GDP fell heavily and unemployment
rose compared to other countries. Finland experienced a very deep recession.
However, when the reforms of 1997 and 1998 targeting partnerships and sole
4
proprietors took place, the Finnish economy had already been growing for a
few years. Note also that there is no visible deviation from the general time
trends in Finland in 1997 or 1998. This suggests that the reforms did not
have significant and immediate macroeconomic consequences. This is not a
concern for the current study, since the reforms were targeted at a small part
of the Finnish economy. Moreover, a significant macroeconomic effect would
have weakened our identification strategy, since then the general equilibrium
effects would have caused an identification problem that we could not control
for.
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Figure 1: GDP per capita and unemployment in Finland, Sweden and OECD
average over time.
2.2 The institutional background
The tax system for all income in Finland is the Nordic Dual Income Tax
(DIT) system that has been in place since 1993 (Nielsen and Sörensen 1997
and Kanniainen et al. 2007). Capital income from firms is imputed, which
is a variant of the imputed income method (Boadway and Bruce, 1984).
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In general, the motivations for the DIT system include attempts to re-
duce distortion on incentives to save and to limit incentives for tax arbitrage
through a proportional capital tax system. At the same time, progressive
earned income taxation maintains the ability to redistribute more income
from the rich to the poor. The weak point of the system is horizontal eq-
uity, since labor income may be heavily taxed, whilst similar work as an
entrepreneur may not be.
Income from firms is taxed as part of personal income of the owner, and
it is split into capital and earned income by a predetermined rule (Lindhe et
al. 2004). The split is made according to a fixed share of net assets and other
determinants of the firm in the previous year. Capital income tax in Finland
was proportional 28% in 1997. In the taxation of an entrepreneur, earned
income from firm and other sources are lumped together. Earned income tax
is progressive, with the lowest marginal tax rates being zero and the highest
marginal tax rates being over 60%. Therefore, even with low income from
a firm, the marginal tax rate could be high, if one has earned income from
other sources. As a consequence, when total income is high enough, earned
income is substantially more heavily taxed than capital income from the firm.
The institutional setting for legal forms in Finland resembles that of the
UK (Crawford and Freedman 2010). The main three legal forms are sole pro-
prietors, partnerships and corporations. The two former ones face the same
overall tax system (DIT), but the particular tax rules between corporations
and unincorporated firms differ. The corporations need to remit corporate
income tax on top of the owner’s income tax for the income from the firm.
Instead, unincorporated firms do not have corporate income tax, only the
owner’s income tax. The corporations differ, because they issue dividends
and the liability of the owner is limited to the stocks in the company. The
largest share of legal forms among all firms consist of sole proprietors. How-
ever, a large number of these are small in output size or do not have any
activity. Partnerships are usually owned by either one entrepreneur or small
number of entrepreneurs.
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2.3 The reforms
The reforms in 1997 and 1998 affected the income-splitting rule for unincor-
porated firms, i.e. partnerships and sole proprietors. The 1997 reform had
been planned for a while, but the details were changed at the last minute (HE
105/1996). It was only in September 1996 that the government announced
that there was going to be a new tax rule, where part of the wage sum is
added to the net assets of the firm. Thus, affected firms did not have time
to anticipate this reform. The law was passed in the last weeks of 1996 and
there was not much discussion about it in the Finnish media prior to the end
of 1996.
In 1996, prior to the reforms, a sum of 15% of the net assets of the
previous year was considered as capital income. This changed in 1997 to
18% of net assets. An even larger change was that 30% of the wage sum of
the previous year was added to net assets. Therefore the tax burden declined
for all entrepreneurs who had an unincorporated firm and who had enough
income for their earned income tax rate (τE) to be higher than the capital
income tax rate (τC). The splitting rule can be presented as a formula as
follows:
Cit = p(Ait−1 + k ∗max(0.5 ∗Dit; 84, 000) + xWLit−1)
where Cit is imputed capital income, Ait net assets, Dit debt and WLit wage
sum in firm i and year t. The 1997 reform increased p from .15 to .18 and x
from 0 to 0.3. The 1998 reform eliminated k: it changed from 1 to 0.
The 1998 reform ended a transit rule where half of the absolute value of
long-term debt D up to 84,000 euros had been added to the asset side of
net assets (ITL 1992). Therefore the 1998 reform reduced the net assets of
affected firms, unlike the 1997 reform. As a result the tax burden increased
for firms that had any long-term debts and whose τE was higher than τC . A
significantly lower number of firms were affected by the ending of transit rule
in 1998 than the reform in 1997. The transit rule was created in a law that
took effect from the beginning of 1993. This is the same law that created
the DIT system for unincorporated firms, and consequently for all income
7
earned in Finland.
We define the marginal tax rate as the marginal increase in taxes for a
marginal increase in income from a firm. Thus the marginal tax depends
on income-splitting, since capital and earned income have different tax rates.
Furthermore, the marginal tax rate depends on the amount of earned income
of a taxpayer in total, since the earned income tax schedule is progressive.
The total income y from the firm faces a total tax burden T according to the
formula:
T = C ∗ τC + (y − C) ∗ τE
where C is the imputed capital income taxed with capital tax rate (τC) .3
Correspondingly (y − C) is the part of income taxed by τE.4 From the
formula it is evident that the total tax burden as well as the average tax
rate is affected by the two tax rates: capital and earned income. Therefore
the reform affected the total tax burden T by changing C. The effect of
changing C on taxes is simply ∂T/∂C = τC − τE, which is negative (the tax
burden is reduced), when τE is larger than τC . The reforms effectively shift
the whole tax schedule left or right depending on these two tax rates. Note
that given C, the marginal tax rate (increase in the tax burden from extra
income) depends only on τE and not τC :
MTR = ∂T
∂y
= τE + (y − C) ∗ ∂τE
∂y
.
Since MTR does not depend on C, net assets and wages that determine
C do not affect the marginal tax rate in the present year. However, over time
the firm can affect also C. This allows intertemporal tax planning.
In sum, the reforms affected the total tax burden by shifting the tax
schedule left or right and marginal tax rates by changing the amount of
3If the firm has C larger than y, the owner only pays capital income tax.
4A typical entrepreneur in Finland at the time of the reforms had 32,000 euro income
from her firm and the typical net assets and wages were 33,000 and 23,000 euros. Thus
according to the imputation rule the imputed capital income C was 7,200. Thus the income
taxed with earned income is 32, 000 − 7, 200 = 24, 800. The τC was 28 %, and τE with
this income level 35 %. The total tax burden is then 7, 200 ∗ 0.28 + 24, 800 ∗ 0.35 = 10, 696
euros. The average tax rate was 10, 696/32, 000 = 0.334.
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income taxed as earned income. Both the average and marginal tax rate
schedules were shifted in similar fashion.
Figure 2 presents four different scenarios of the total marginal tax rate
schedules depending on the characteristics of the firm under the income-
splitting rule. We composed the figure by applying, to the actual tax code,
a range of incomes and four typical scenarios of net assets, wages and debts
in the firm.5 The tax schedule increases in a stepwise manner. This results
from the stepwise progressive earned income tax schedule. The figure also
presents how this changes in the dual reforms. It is evident that there is a
dip in the tax schedule: for the lowest income the tax rate is only τC of 28%,
and then for a range of incomes it dips to a lower tax rate. The dip occurs
when τE kicks in, which is lower than τC on low incomes.
5Wages is the wage sum of the firm paid either to employees or to the firm owner
herself.
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Figure 2: Marginal tax rates before and after the two reforms
Note: Each panel shows the marginal tax rate schedule of total income from an unincorporated company before and after
the two reforms in 1997 and 1998. The figure presents four different combinations that affect the splitting rule between
capital and earned income.
The two reforms affected the marginal income schedule, depending on the
size of the firm’s net assets, wages and long-term debts. It is evident that
the 1997 reform, which affected the imputed income rule in favor of capital
income, eased the tax burden of everyone high enough in the marginal tax
schedule. On the other hand, for those on low incomes, the reform increased
the marginal tax rate. Then again, those that had high enough long-term
debts and high income experienced an increase in marginal tax rates, evident
in the lower right panel of the figure.
The marginal tax rate features two extreme cases depending on the size
of net assets. It is possible for the net assets of the firm to be so great relative
to income that it only pays capital income taxes. On the other hand, if a
firm does not have positive net assets, it only pays taxes according to the
earned income tax schedule. Neither of these extreme cases are interesting
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for our analysis here, since we are interested in cases where the marginal tax
schedule shifted due to a change in imputed capital income. Therefore we
exclude all firms from our estimation sample that feature these two cases.
At the time of the reforms, firms could not choose how the income split
was made. However, they could engage in intertemporal tax planning by
altering their net assets, or after the 1997 reform, by increasing their wage
sum. One avenue of intertemporal tax planning for entrepreneurs is to choose
the legal form of their firm so as to minimize the tax burden.
The reasons for the government to reform the tax system are not perfectly
clear. The overall reason is that the tax reforms from 1991 to 1993 modified
the tax system for incorporated firms so that their taxation became signifi-
cantly lighter than for unincorporated firms. Therefore, the main reason to
reform the tax system for unincorporated firms was to retain tax neutrality
across legal forms of firms. As for the motivation for the particular details
of the tax system, especially the 30 per cent wage sum feature, there is no
published reasoning as to why the government wanted to have that in the
tax code.
2.4 Model of entrepreneurial choices
A priori, it is not clear how the DIT tax system and the reforms of 1997
and 1998 affect the behaviour of entrepreneurs. This is because it is possible
that entrepreneurs have incentives to produce greater income from their firm
and also save more, but it is also possible that they want to consume the
extra income right away. We present a theoretical model in which this kind
of tax system could affect entrepreneurial choices. The idea of the model is
to focus on the changes in entrepreneurial effort decisions as a response to
changes in the tax system, as in Kanniainen et al. (2007) and Carroll et al.
(2001). The distinction between our model and earlier literature is that we
let entrepreneurs affect their own tax rate through tax planning in addition
to the choice of effort level.
We employ a two-period model, since the tax system affects and depends
on time-dependent decisions, like saving. The model highlights how time
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preference, alternative return on savings and tax rules together affect the
effort and saving choices of an entrepreneur. The model abstracts from the
details of the tax system, since the idea is to focus on the behavior of an
entrepreneur in a tax system, where a part of income is imputed. However, we
retain enough structure from the actual Finnish tax structure in the model so
that theoretical predictions can be linked with the empirical analysis below.
The model features a utility-maximizing entrepreneur. She produces in-
come by exerting effort in a firm. The entrepreneur enjoys utility from con-
sumption and dislikes effort. In the first period the entrepreneur makes
relevant production choices and may transfer negative or positive income to
the second period either within the firm or from her own consumption. In
the second period the entrepreneur enjoys consumption from savings and
exogenous income and initial net assets.
An inter-temporal utility function is written in the separable utility form
u(c1) + h(e1) + δu(c2)
where c1 and e1 refer to consumption and effort in period 1 and c2 consump-
tion in period 2. The utility function has the standard properties: uc > 0,
ucc < 0, he < 0 and hee < 0. The discount factor is 0 < δ < 1.
The entrepreneur has a firm that produces income yi in period i = 1, 2.
In the first period the entrepreneur produces income in the firm using effort.
The production function is proportional to effort and is denoted ne1, n > 1.
In the second period the entrepreneur earns only exogenous income Y . The
entrepreneur can also transfer income from period 1 to period 2 using two
different income transfers. The first is to transfer an amount of income m
within the firm. A positive income transfer from period one is thought to
reduce the taxable income in period one, and thus reflect the tax planning
possibilities.6 This also reduces the exogenous initial net assets A already in
the firm. Income transfer m captures the possibility to increase net assets
6In the actual tax system this coincides with investing within firm either to productive
machinery or to some other goods that later show up as assets in the firm. Other possibility
is to transfer within firm assets, but this is done from after tax income. Therefore the
model does not capture these income transfers.
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A within the firm over time. The net assets A left in the firm are consumed
in the second period. The second method of transferring income is to save
or dissave amount R from private consumption at an interest factor r > 0,
where the interest rate would be 1 − r. The incomes from the firm for the
two periods are denoted as follows:
y1 = ne1 −m
y2 = Y +m
The entrepreneur consumes income from the firm, but has to pay taxes
on that income. The periodic budget constraints are written as follows:
c1 = y1 − T1(y1, µ(A−m))−R
c2 = y2 − T2(y2, µ(A+m)) + rR + A
The tax function and its effect on the endogenous variables are the focus of
this model. As described in the previous section, the actual reforms shifted
the whole tax function and also affected the marginal tax rates. The tax
function imposed to the model mimics these features without going too deep
into the details of the actual tax system to be analytically tractable.
The periodic tax function Ti in period i is a function of two arguments:
income yi and exogenous net assets within the firm µ(A − m). We denote
T (y, µ(A − m)) = T (y,m) to simplify the notation. We assume that the
tax function is progressive in income ∂T
∂y
= Ty > 0, Tyy > 0. The special
tax rule, the second argument, is affected by exogenous net assets A, which
the entrepreneur can change through an income transfer m from period 1 to
period 2. The more income that is transferred within firm, the smaller the
tax burden due to the special tax rule ( ∂T
∂m
= Tm < 0), and this relationship
is linear (Tmm = 0).7 This transfer is multiplied by the parameter µ, which
7The main results are qualitatively the same also with Tmm > 0. They are not pre-
sented here, since this assumption introduces complicated terms without adding anything
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reflects the share of net assets used to calculate the share of income liable to
capital income tax. We assume Tµ < 0 and Tµµ < 0.
The special tax rule captures the fact that increasing net assets in the
firm reduces the marginal income tax rate. This is in line with the imputed
income method, which allows, as a function of assets, a larger share of profits
to be taxed at a lower capital income tax rate. Finally note that the special
tax rule is not affected by savings from private consumption R, which is again
similar to the actual tax system.
We insert the periodic budget constraints in the utility function and get
the inter-temporal objective function:
U = u1 (ne1 −m− T1 (ne1 −m,m)−R) + h(e1)
+ δu2 (Y +m− T2 (Y +m,m) + rR + A)
We present the conditions of the FOCs for tax rates and m in the Appendix.
Inserting from (5) to (6), it follows:
r (1− T1y − T1m) = 1− T2y − T2m
This condition reveals that the first derivatives of the tax rates in the two
periods are linked by the interest rate. Without the special tax rule that
induces the terms Tim, the interest rate would equal the ratio of the net of
the marginal tax rates in the two periods.
We are interested in the effect of a reform to parameter µ, which reflects
the significance of the special tax rule, on the choice variables: effort and
savings within the firm. With the assumptions in the model increasing µ
reduces the progressive income tax rate. However, since µ affects the second
argument, assets, in the tax function, this is not the same as changing the
first argument, income. This corresponds to the actual reform, where both
the average and marginal tax rates were changed. The second-order condition
and derivation of the following results is presented in the Appendix. Utilizing
interesting to the model.
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Cramer’s rule, we obtain the following results:
∂e∗1
∂µ
≷ 0⇒ T1µ
T2µ
≷ δru2cc
u1cc
and
∂m∗
∂µ
≷ 0⇒ T1µ
T2µ
≷ δru2cc
u1cc
.
These results imply that the tax reform that makes assets in the firm
more significant in taxation, and thus reduces the income tax burden of the
entrepreneur, increases the effort of the entrepreneur and savings within the
firm when the entrepreneur is relatively patient. This is because increasing
µ has a positive effect on equilibrium effort and income transfers when the
derivative of the tax rate with respect to µ is larger in period 1 than in period
2 and when the second derivative of utility is relatively smaller in period 2.
Within the model these conditions are fulfilled when, firstly, there is relatively
less income in period 1 and / or, secondly, relatively more consumption in
period 2. This in turn is consistent for transferring income from the first to
the second period, i.e. not eating all extra income right away. Therefore the
kind of entrepreneur that cares more about future than present consumption
has higher income in the second period.
This model predicts that a tax reform that increases imputed capital
income increases effort and thus leads to greater output for some firms. These
are firms that are relatively forward-looking. If some entrepreneurs care more
about the present than the future, this kind of reform could decrease effort
and thus output of firms. The same entrepreneurs would also lower the net
assets of the firm. The intuition for this is that the reform makes taxation
lighter in the first period and the entrepreneur aims to consume this extra
income immediately and needs to exert less effort as a consequence. This is
similar to the standard income effect dominating substitution effect result.
In reality entrepreneurs have other choice variables that might lead to
increasing output of the firm than just effort. The model abstracts from
these possibilities to remain tractable. One significant input for the firm
would be labour demand, and another investments. We argue that although
15
the presented model does not capture all details about how taxation affects
these input choices, increasing labour demand or investing more to capital
requires managerial decisions, and thus entrepreneurial effort. On the other
hand if the firms are relatively small, an entrepreneur is the firm. Even with
a small number of employees, the entrepreneurs usually also work themselves
in the firm. Furthermore, since the tax reforms we are studying affected the
income taxation of the owner of the firm, it is natural that the entrepreneur
wants to adjust her own consumption and, as a result, income from the firm
as a response. It remains an empirical question which margin within firms
adjust to the reforms we are studying. The answer to that question is pursued
next.
3 Econometric specification
3.1 Treatment and control groups
As described in the institutional setting section (2.2), the tax reforms applied
to partnerships and sole proprietors. Therefore, firms with these legal forms
comprise the treatment group. Corporations comprise the control group. The
reforms affected the marginal tax rate structure of income from unincorpo-
rated firms while it remained constant for corporated firms. Therefore we
can analyze the effects of marginal tax rates on firm-level outcomes by com-
paring the changes in taxes and outcomes between these two groups before
and after the reform.
3.2 Difference in differences
We apply a difference-in-differences (DD) approach, using both binary and
continuous treatment to find the causal effect that the tax system has on the
treated group. The standard binary DD approach compares treatment and
control groups before and after the reform. Since we have a rich variation
in marginal tax rates due to the reforms, we can regress the continuous in
tax rate variables on the changes in outcomes. This model is a DD approach
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with continuous treatment, where there is no change in the tax rates for the
control group. We estimate the following equations:
4lnyit = αi + β1DDit + γXit + υt + νit (1)
4lnyit = αi + β2lnTR(I96)it + γXit + υt + νit (2)
4lnyit = αi + 4lnMTR(I96)it + γXit + νit (3)
where y represents the outcome for firm i in year t. The main outcome is
logarithmic turnover, since it is a key variable describing the output of a
firm. The other outcomes are the wage bill, number of employees, assets and
investments. The explanatory variable of interest in equation (1) is a DD
indicator, in equation (2) the log of the tax rate variable and in equation
(3) the change in the log marginal tax rate, the coefficient of which  can be
interpreted directly as an elasticity with respect to the marginal tax rate. In
equation (2) we use alternatively the average tax rate or the marginal tax
rate. Xit contains a list of firm-level control variables from the accounting
data and group level variables like a linear time trend for the treatment
group. αi indicates that we utilize a fixed-effects specification to control for
firm-specific effects. Therefore, with the differential specification that we
utilize, this includes firm-specific trends. Furthermore, υt indicates that we
include year fixed effects to control for flexible time trends that are common
to all firms. νit is the residual error term.
For the explanatory variable to be exogenous, it can not depend on the
behaviour of the firm as a response to the reform. Clearly, the observed
marginal tax rates in equations (2) and (3) are endogenous, since they depend
directly on income, which is one of the outcome variables. Thus we utilize
changes in the imputed marginal tax rates, instead of the observed, that
do not depend on the behavior of the firm. The imputed tax rates utilize
changes in the tax law arising from the two reforms. We apply to pre-reform
income (average between 1994 and 1996) and other determinants of marginal
tax rates the tax laws of each year, and especially the reform years (1997
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and 1998), as Gruber and Saez (2002) did. The imputed marginal tax rate
is calculated using the variation in wage sums, long-term debts and total
owners’ income due to the reform. As described in section 2.2, the wage sum
affects net assets from 1997 onwards and long-term debts until 1998. We
observe all relevant variables in the data, and thus can calculate marginal
tax rates for all owners for each year in the data. For partnership owners we
also observe income from other sources than from the firm.8
We are interested in the elasticity of turnover with respect to marginal
tax rates. We estimate the equation 3, where firm’s proportional change in
turnover is estimated against proportional change in marginal tax rate to
identify this elasticity. We only compare growth rates just before and just
after the reforms, since the tax rates did not change in other years. The
coefficient  from this estimation is similar to elasticity of taxable income,
except for turnover instead of income. This methodology follows that in the
elasticity of taxable income literature (see Saez et al. 2012).9
We exclude sole proprietors from most of the analysis for two reasons.
Firstly, many sole proprietors did not face any change in their taxation due
to the reform (see figure 3). Moreover from those who did, nearly as many
faced an increase in their marginal tax burden as faced a decrease. Secondly,
as stated in section 3.2, we are not able to impute correct MTRs for all sole
proprietors as we do not observe all of their income, contrary to partnerships.
Even though, the tax burden of some sole proprietors did decrease, and
therefore we present some standard DD analysis for them.
3.3 Potential identification problems and solutions
We apply a DD strategy and thus the normal DD assumption must apply:
the control group should represent the counterfactual.10 Thus equation 1
8The statistics for the imputed the marginal tax rates are given in table 1 and the
distribution is shown in figure 3.
9Our approach differs from elasticity of taxable income literature in that we can com-
pare firms with similar income instead of comparing e.g. rich firms with poor firms.
(Gruber and Saez 2002, Saez 2003, Kopczuk 2005 and Pirttilä and Selin 2011).
10Figure B5 in the Appendix comprises the mean values of the main outcome variables
over time to show the development of trends for partnerships and corporations.
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identifies the causal effect of the reforms if the treatment and control groups
would have behaved similarly over time in the absence of the reforms. Since
the estimated equation is in a difference form, and is estimated using a fixed-
effects procedure, we can control for time trends across firms in a flexible
way. When the treatment group deviates at the time of the tax reforms
from the behaviour of the control group and in other periods from their own
behaviour, we assign these changes to be caused by the tax variable. If we
did not have corporations in the control group, this method would not be
possible, since we could not separate the changes in the outcome variable
from general time trends. Thus the DD assumption is most likely violated
if there are unobserved shocks at the time of the reforms that affect the two
groups in a different way. Figures 4 and B5 compare time trends in number
of outcome variables. It seems that the DD assumption gets support from
the similar trends in the figures in other than the reform years.
In principle the only difference between treated and untreated firms is
the legal form. As a consequence they are observationally part of the same
economy, face the same fluctuations from the global economy and changes
in market conditions like demand for their products. Even so, there could
be differences between these groups and changes in the conditions they face.
One is international trade. If the control group e.g. has a lot of interna-
tional customers and subsidiaries abroad and the treatment group has not,
the groups could experience different shocks coming from international trade.
To eliminate this potential problem, we exclude from our sample large cor-
porations that have international activity like subsidiaries abroad.
Potential problems are selection into exit, selective entry or switching
legal form. In the main estimates we exclude these extensive margin be-
haviours by focusing on firms that continue in the sample before and after
the reforms. If we find that the reforms changed behaviour in the treatment
group relative to the control group, this is a true intensive margin response in
these firms. A remaining problem is that the continuing firms both in treat-
ment and control groups are a selected sample and might not represent the
whole economy. To check for this, we also look at how these extensive margin
behaviours were affected by the reforms after the main estimates. Since the
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sample of continuing firms represent a major share of the Finnish economy,
we interpret the extensive margin responses to be additional responses to the
intensive margin responses.
We impute the marginal tax rates for each year according to the tax law
of that year and 1996 income and net assets information for each firm as
explained above. This might lead to measurement error if we make a mis-
take in the imputing process. The standard solution for this in the elasticity
of taxable income literature (Gruber and Saez, 2001) is to instrument the
actual tax rate with the imputed tax rate and use variation from this to
explain the changes in outcomes. We also present these instrumented results
after the main DD results as a robustness check. The DD estimates are the
main estimates, because they are more transparent due to the clear source of
identifying variation used there. Furthermore, we perform standard DD esti-
mates using just an indicator of the treatment group instead of the marginal
tax rate variable to make sure that measurement error in the tax variable is
not driving the results.
4 Data description
We perform the estimations on comprehensive tax record panel data for the
years 1994 to 2000. The data come from the Finnish Tax Administration
and they include every firm liable to taxation in Finland.11 The data set
contains information on the financial statements and tax records of Finnish
businesses, as well as information on the taxation of business owners.
The data contain all the important tax information for our analysis. We
observe income from the firm, net assets, the wage bill and long-term debts,
which influence marginal tax rates. In addition, for partnerships we observe
the income of the firm’s owner earned from sources other than the firm. The
most relevant outcome for our analysis in the data is the turnover of the firm.
This variable captures how much output the firm made and thus it is at the
11Sole proprietors are in the data and the reforms in principle applied to them. However,
empirically their tax incentives did not change much and they can’t be compared well with
corporations in a way required as figure B1 shows in the appendix.
20
same time a good indicator of the economic activity of the owner of the firm
among small businesses.
4.1 Descriptive statistics
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the outcome variables: turnover,
wages, investments and assets pooled between the years 1996 and 1998. The
table is for the main estimation sample, in which firms are required to have
income in 1996. Furthermore we have excluded firms having international
operations. The table is divided according to the legal form of the firm.
Partnerships are in the treatment group and corporations in the control
group. There are more corporations than partnerships and they are on av-
erage larger. However, the bulk of the firms in the two groups are of similar
size, the difference is that there are few really large corporations. Table B1
in the appendix gives similar statistics for the control variables used in the
regression analysis.
Table 1 also contains the imputed marginal tax rate which has important
role as an explanatory variable in our consequent regression analysis. We
impute the marginal tax rates by applying to the income information from
pre-reform years the changes in the tax code for each year. For some owners
the pre-reform income information was missing. Thus, to be able to calculate
the imputed marginal tax rates, we needed first to impute income for those
who had missing income information. We imputed the incomes according to
other observational characteristics of the firms that we did observe. Those
were assets, output of the firm and some cost variables. The share of ob-
servations replaced in this way is 16 % of the total sample. In addition, we
exclude a small fraction of firms, for which we can not calculate the change
in tax incentives correctly. Those firms were low in the marginal tax rate
schedule and represent 3 % of the total share of partnership owners.
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Firm type Statistics Turnover Wages Investments Assets Imp. MTR
Partnership Mean 249445 31770 12885 112801 .358
N 103013 103013 103013 103013 103013
SD 1123436 78234 46686 1691747 .091
N of firms 14788 14788 14788 14788 14788
Corporations Mean 483917 89414 27538 335397 .278
N 253151 253151 253151 253151 253151
SD 954354 194671 452553 6121030 .134
N of firms 36957 36957 36957 36957 36957
Total N of firms 51745 51745 51745 51745 51745
Table 1: Descriptive statistics in euros for years from 1996 to 1998
Note: Mean and standard deviation (SD) are in euros. Number of observations (N) and number of firms (N of firms) are
the count statistics in the data.
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for partnerships and their owners.
The total labour income statistic describes how much labour income in total
the owner of a partnership had, and the labour income statistic is for the
income from the firm. The table gives similar statistics for capital income. It
is evident that on average most of the income for the owners come from the
firm. They have income from some other sources as well, but on average it
seems that the firm is the major source of income for the owners. Therefore
the firm could be seen as the place where the entrepreneurs are employed
(for themselves), rather than merely owning the firm for investing purposes.
The average number of owners per firm is two. This supports the view that
the entrepreneurs are tightly linked to their firm, instead of being distant
investors in a firm.
From table 2 it is evident that the firms in treatment group do not have
many employees: 30 per cent of partnerships are with no employees and on
average they have 4 employees. This means that an entrepreneur needs to
exert own effort in order to keep her firm running. Therefore there must be
a link between the output of the firm and the effort or hours of work that
the entrepreneur puts forward.
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Total labour
income
Total capital
income
Labour
income
Capital
income
Employees
Mean 26,828 6,777 20,420 4,773 4.05
Median 22,058 2,877 16,830 2,224 2
Share of no
employees
N of owners
per firm
4lnMTR
from 96 to
97
Mean 0.306 1.98 -0.037
N 72,786 72786 72,786 72,786 72,786
Table 2: Descriptive statistics in euros for partnerships
Note: The mean and median statistics are in euros for all the variables except for number of employees (Employees),
which presents the average number of employees.
Figure 3 describes the proportional changes in imputed MTRs and tax
burdens from 1996 to 1998 for partnerships. The imputed MTRs are calcu-
lated using the data for each firm, as explained earlier in sections 2.2, 3.2
and described in figure 2. The change in tax burden is calculated applying
changes in the tax laws to the income from the firm from 1996. As the figure
shows, the reforms induced a lot of variation in MTRs, both increases and
decreases. Evidently, as a net effect of the two reforms, most partnerships
did face a decrease in their MTRs, and only fewer than 5% faced no change.
Furthermore, their total tax burden changed by several hundreds or even
thousands of euros due to the reforms.
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Figure 3: Distribution of proportional changes in marginal tax rates and tax
burden in euros for partnerships
Note: The figure shows the distribution of changes in imputed marginal tax rates and tax burden from 1996 to 1998 due
to the double reform.
Figure 4 presents the trends over time in proportional growth in turnover
in the treatment and control groups. The figure is composed so that the
left panel presents the mean over the two groups in the logarithmic change
in turnover. Figure B5 in the appendix offers a similar graph for other
outcomes. The right panel in figure 4 presents the coefficients from a fixed
effects regression. It plots the interaction of year and a treatment group
indicators on the change in log turnover. Both panels present clearly the
jump in the treatment group (partnerships) at the time of the 1997 reform.
There is no deviation from overall trend in the control group (corporations).
In other years the trends in two groups follow each other pretty well, which
gives credibility to the estimation strategy.
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Figure 4: Development of turnover growth rate in partnerships and corpora-
tions
Note: The figure compares proportional change in turnover between partnerships in the treatment group and companies in
the control group. The effects are from a fixed effect regression where change in logarithmic turnover is regressed against
interaction between year and treatment group indicators. The confidence intervals are 95 % interval from robust standard
errors.
5 Results
We study the effect of the reforms empirically, first on the turnover (output)
of firms and then on other outcomes. We perform estimations by applying
the natural experimental method described in section 3 on firm-level data
described in section 4. We estimate these only for partnerships in the treat-
ment group and corporations in the control group. We do not include sole
proprietors into the treatment group, since the reform did not apply to them
much and they can not be compared with corporations well, as indicated in
figure B1.
All outcomes are in the change of logarithmic form, since we are inter-
ested in the growth rate of outcomes. We present a standard differences-
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in-differences (DD) specifications to show what happened to the outcome in
the treatment group after the reform relative to the control group. We are
interested in how much variation in tax rates drives the change in outcomes.
To this end we present specifications with a continuous treatment, where the
explanatory variable of interest is a log tax rate or change in the log tax rate.
The point estimates from the latter can be interpreted as an elasticity of
outcome with respect to the tax rates. A positive coefficient in a DD specifi-
cation indicates that turnover started to grow faster in unincorporated firms
after the reform, and likewise a negative coefficient in a tax rate specification.
Table 3 presents the main estimation results, where the outcome is the
proportional growth of turnover. The table compares partnerships in treat-
ment group with corporations in control group. Column (1) presents a stan-
dard DD estimation results from fixed effects regression without additional
controls. Column (2) adds to this year indicators, a linear trend for treat-
ment group and firm level controls. Both results indicate that turnover grew
5% faster in treatment group due to the reforms. This result is comparable
with the jump in treatment group trend in figure 4.
Column (3) presents the results for the imputed log marginal tax rate
as the outcome variable. This result is not statistically very strong, but it
indicates that the relative changes in the marginal tax rate are associated
with a 9% growth in turnover. To estimate the elasticity of the marginal tax
rate with respect to turnover, columns (4) and (5) compares the difference
in the log marginal tax rate with the difference in the log turnover. Column
(4) utilizes the 1997 reform by comparing the growth rates in 1996 with the
growth rates in 1997. Similarly, column (5) utilizes the 1998 reform and
compares growth rates in 1997 with those in 1998. We do not include more
years to these estimates, since there were no changes in the tax code in other
that the reform years. Column (4) presents our preferred estimate for the
elasticity of turnover with respect to tax rate: -0.17.12 The result in column
(5) implies a smaller elasticity and it is not statistically significant. This is
12We also performed the estimation with the net-of-tax rate as the explanatory variable
in place of the marginal tax rate. This estimation produced a larger elasticity estimate
than the marginal tax rate estimation.
26
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
DD DD log MTR ∆ln MTR 96-97 ∆ln MTR 97-98
DD 0.051*** 0.056***
(0.005) (0.009)
lnMTR -0.089*
(0.054)
4lnMTR -0.172** -0.019
(0.081) (0.079)
N 298,380 298,380 293,679 101,852 101,847
R2 0.004 0.022 0.022 0.017 0.020
N of firms 51,745 51,745 50,926 50,926 50,926
Note: Fixed effects regressions that compare partnerships with corporations for the change of log turnover. Columns
(1) and (2) present a standard DD specification. Column (2) adds flexible time and firm level controls to the simple
specification in column (1). Column (3) presents the continuous treatment model with the log of marginal tax rate as
explanatory variable. Columns (4) and (5) present the elasticity estimations comparing the effect of changes in marginal
tax rates with changes in growth rate of log turnover. Column (4) compares years 1996 and 1997 and column (5) years
1997 and 1998. Estimations include a comprehensive set of control variable: year dummies, other income, rent expenses,
purchasing expenses and fixed expenses. Robust standard errors in parentheses:*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 3: Main estimation results
not surprising, since the variation in tax rates induced by the 1998 reform was
smaller than that induced by 1997 reform and it applied to a much smaller
group than the 1997 reform.
We study whether there were heterogeneous treatment effects. Table 4
presents the divided-sample results for turnover. Each column is divided in to
three parts: they first present the average of proportional changes in marginal
tax rates, then the DD results and finally the elasticity estimate utilizing
changes in the log marginal tax rate. We first divide the sample by the
greatness of changes in the imputed marginal tax rate due to the 1997 reform.
We do this because we are interested whether those responded more whose
tax incentives changed more. This would imply that the reform can indeed
be interpreted as a natural experiment with continuous treatment. Figure
B2 in the appendix presents how the growth rate of turnover and marginal
tax rates changed over time in the two groups. The figure and the first two
columns in table 4 support our view that the reform can be interpreted as
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a continuous treatment model. In the group where the marginal tax rate
decreased more than two per cent (and the average change is -10%), the
turnover shows visible increase. On the other hand, in the group where the
tax rate decreased between 0 and 2 %, the turnover do not show any great
increase. In the large change group we estimate an elasticity of -0.39 and
in the latter small change group the elasticity estimate is not statistically
significant.
We then divide the sample by the size of income prior to the 1997 reform.
We use the average income from the firm between 1994 to 1996 to alleviate
mean reversion problems. We divide the sample by income, because we
want to know whether higher income firm owners responded to tax incentives
more. In the elasticity of taxable income literature it is found that individuals
higher in the marginal tax rate schedule, and who consequently has higher
income, respond more to tax incentives (Gruber and Saez 2002 and Saez et al.
2012). In this case the marginal tax rate division is not suitable, since higher
income taxpayers may have lower marginal tax rate if they have a lot of net
assets, since the capital income imputation affects the tax rates. Therefore we
divide the sample directly by median income instead. Figure B3 presents the
development of proportional turnover and marginal tax rate on average over
time. The last two columns in table 4 give the estimation results for these
two groups. It seems that higher income tax group had on average greater
change in tax incentives and they responded more. We estimate an elasticity
of -0.38 for this group. On the other hand we find smaller and statistically
insignificant result for lower income group. The results support the findings
in earlier literature that higher income individuals respond more. However,
the graphical evidence presented in figure B3 indicates that the difference
between these two groups is not very large.
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Divided by Divided by
4lnMTR profits in 1994-1996
<-0.02 -0.02<4 <0 High Low
4lnMTR -0.109 -0.007 -0.049 -0.024
DD 0.042*** 0.027** 0.076*** 0.018
(0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.015)
N 204,398 211,705 114,553 135,919
R2 0.022 0.021 0.034 0.015
N of firms 34,341 35,584 19,238 22,882
4lnMTR -0.298*** -1.342 -0.369*** 0.017
(0.083) (1.067) (0.110) (0.134)
N 67,374 69,860 38,476 44,454
R2 0.020 0.018 0.041 0.006
N of firms 33,687 34,930 19,238 22,227
N treated 4,913 6,156 6,887 5,805
Note: Fixed effects regressions for the change of log turnover. lnMTR is the log of the imputed marginal tax rate. The
results are divided according to two dimensions: 1) the size of the change in the marginal tax rate between 1996 and 1997
and 2) by median profits between 1994 and 1996. The table shows the change in marginal tax rates on average, a DD
estimate and an elasticity estimate for each group. The same set of control variables is used as in the main estimations.
Robust standard errors in parentheses:*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 4: Results divided by the pre-reform size of MTR
We present robustness checks in table 5, to check against potential iden-
tification problems discussed in section 3. Column (1) is an instrumental
variables regression, where the observed marginal tax rates are instrumented
with imputed marginal tax rates. This instrument should be valid, since it
uses the changes in legislation, which do not depend on the behaviour of
firms. Thus the first-stage regression indicates how much the imputed tax
rate explains the observed tax rates. The coefficient from first stage is 1.7,
implying that the actual marginal tax rate is larger than the imputed one.
The first stage result and the F-test indicate that the instruments are strong.
The second stage result for turnover is very close to the main estimation re-
sults in table 3, column (4). Thus it seems that measurement errors in the
tax variable do not endanger our identification strategy.
The second column in table 5 presents a placebo result, where it is pre-
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tended that the reform happened in 1999 instead of 1997. This is achieved
by moving the actual imputed tax variables forward in the data. We find no
statistically significant effect from the placebo estimate. We conclude from
this estimate, and from figure 4, that treatment and control groups develop is
similar manner over time, except in the reform year 1997. Thus, unobserved
shocks do not seem to be driving our main results.
The last column of the table presents an elasticity estimation using the
average tax rate in place of the marginal tax rate. Otherwise the estimation
is similar to our main estimation result in table 3, column (4). The point
estimate is -0.47, which is somewhat larger than the main estimate of -0.17.
Therefore it seems that there is variation in the tax rates induced by the
reforms that the marginal tax rate does not fully capture. It is possible
that especially the owners of firms high in the marginal tax rate schedule
experienced only a small change in their marginal tax rate schedule, but
since the total tax burden is achieved integrating the whole marginal tax
rate schedule up to that point, their average tax rate changed by a lot more
than the marginal tax rate. The heterogeneous results indicate that higher
income individuals responded more.
We estimate the effect of reforms on other outcomes than turnover. Figure
B5 in the appendix presents how these outcome variables developed over
time in the treatment and control groups. The figure presents the growth
rate for those firms that had positive pre- and post-reform observations,
for years from 1995 to 1999, in the outcome variable. Additionally, the
firms in the figure were required to have some turnover between 1995 and
1997. We impose these restrictions since we are interested in intensive margin
responses, so that the firms needed to exist before the reforms. It is evident
that the treatment and control groups in general develop in similar manner
over time in the outcome variables in the figure. Therefore the requirement
for common time trends seems to hold for the other outcome variables as well
as for turnover. The assets and wage sum of partnerships deviate from their
overall trend at the time of the reforms. This indicates that partnerships
responded to the 1997 reform by increasing their total assets and wage sums.
There is no clear deviation from the trend for investments or number of
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IV Placebo ATR
4lnMTR -0.120** 0.067
(0.049) (0.100)
1st stage 1.710***
(0.030)
4lnATR -0.472***
(0.132)
N 84,538 99,013 103,490
R2 0.018 0.023 0.017
N of firms 42,269 50,926 51,745
F test 658.44
Note: Fixed effects regressions for the change in the log of turnover. First column presents an instrumental
variable estimate, where the actual marginal tax rate is instrumented with the imputed marginal tax rate.
Second column presents a placebo estimate, where it is pretended that the reform happened in 1999. The last
column presents an elasticity estimate from the 1997 reform using the average tax rate as an explanatory vari-
able. The same control variables are used as in the main estimates. Robust standard errors in parentheses:***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 5: Robustness of the results
employees.
Figure B4 presents the growth rate of profits for partnerships over time.
It shows that there is a peak in growth of profits in 1997. This indicates that
the increased turnover went to increased profits, and thus income from the
firm. Corresponding profit data from corporations is missing. Thus we could
not graphically compare the development of profits between partnerships and
corporations or perform a DD regression for profits below.
Table 6 presents the results for wage sum, total assets, own capital, debts,
number of employees and investments. We present for each outcome a DD
specification. We find a positive and statistically significant effect for wage
sum. From the graphical inspection it was clear that partnerships increased
their wage sums. It is possible that the owners of firms paid more wages to
themselves. This intuition is supported by a similar result (not shown) for a
sub-group that had no employees prior to the reform. At the same time it
seems that if anything, number of employees decreased as a response to the
reform. However, from figure B5 it seems that there were no clear effect and
the weakly statistically significant result is due to deviation from the general
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trend in control group.
We present the DD specification for total assets, which is own capital plus
debts in the second column of table 6. We also perform the same specification
separately for the two variables that comprise total assets. It seems that
both outcomes increased as a response to the reform. This is possible if
part of the firms increased their own capital and at the same time other
firms their debts. Nevertheless, the prediction from our theoretical model,
that some firms will increase their assets at the same time with the output,
seems to hold. Result on investments in the last column is negative but
not statistically significant. Investments refer here to real investments to
machines and equipments. Goolsbee (1998a) proposes that the supply of
capital goods would be upward sloping. This would explain the result in
literature, that tax incentives are not typically found to increase investments
much, similar to our result.
Wage sum Tot. Assets Own capital Debts Employees Investments
DD 0.082*** 0.030*** 0.064*** 0.134*** -0.022* -0.010
(0.017) (0.010) (0.009) (0.016) (0.012) (0.062)
N 201,663 237,339 202,320 210,686 164,960 127,810
R2 0.011 0.006 0.015 0.005 0.017 0.001
N of firms 40,907 43,772 40,795 37,499 29,437 32,587
Note: Fixed effects regressions for the change in logarithmic wage sum, total assets, own capital, debts, number
of employees and investment. The outcome in each column is the title of the column. The explanatory variable
is a DD indicator. The same set of control variables is used as in the main estimates, except no asset related
control variables for assets, own capital or debts. Robust standard errors in parentheses:*** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 6: Other outcomes
Table 7 presents the results for exit, entry and switching legal form. The
results for exit and entry in columns (1) and (2) are performed with a DD
indicator as an explanatory variable. The overall pattern of the results is
that the reforms induced partnerships both to exit less and enter more often.
This is to be expected, since the reform made the income taxation from a
partnership firm lighter on average. Therefore it is intuitive if entry to this
business form was seen more favorable after the reform. Likewise, especially
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(1) (2) (3)
exit entry switch
DD Effect -0.072*** 0.026*** -0.021***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
N 1,157,040 1,157,040 439,488
R2 0.008 0.001 0.011
N of firms 192,840 192,840 73,248
Note: Fixed effects regressions on indicators for exiting or entering the sample and switching from a partnership to a
corporation in column (3). Regressions do not include additional controls, since these are not observed for non-surviving
firms. In Columns (1) and (2) explanatory variable is a DD indicator. In column (3) explanatory variable is an after
indicator. Robust standard errors in parentheses:*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 7: Results: exit, entry and switching
for low-profitable firms, exiting decisions could have been postponed because
economic conditions were more favorable to continue after the reform. The
exit result in column (1) is relatively large, exit probability is reduced by
more than 7 per cent. This could partly be explained by the recession in
early 1990s in Finland. It is possible that exit was becoming less common
for partnerships a little later than for corporations after the deep recession.
Column (3) presents the switching result from partnerships to corporations.
The estimation is performed by regressing an indicator of switching against
an indicator for after the reform. The result indicates that this switching
probability fell by 2 per cent due to the reforms. This result is similar to
what have been found earlier in literature (Gordon and Mackie-Mason 1994
and Cullen and Gordon 2007).
6 Conclusion
The main goal of this paper was to understand the determinants of en-
trepreneurial choices better. Surprisingly few studies have offered credible
empirical analysis of how the economic activity of entrepreneurs depends on
their tax incentives. We studied entrepreneurial choices both using a theoret-
ical model and by analyzing empirically tax reforms that altered the income
tax rates of entrepreneurs.
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The theoretical model presented a conjecture of how effort decisions and
saving decisions could be affected by a reform to a tax rule that features
an imputed income (Boadway and Bruce 1994). The question is interesting,
since an entrepreneur can affect her income tax rates by saving within the
firm. Alternatively, an entrepreneur can exert more effort within the firm
that then produces more output. Furthermore, the entrepreneur could con-
sume more now and suffer lower consumption in the future. Our theoretical
model predicted that decreasing both marginal and average tax rates through
increasing imputed income in the tax rule increases both effort and income
transfers within firm, but only in some cases. One interpretation for the
result is that effort is increased when the entrepreneur is sufficiently patient.
It remained an empirical question to which direction the tax incentives
affect entrepreneurial choices. Thus we studied empirically the effects of two
Finnish tax reforms. They affected only owners of unincorporated firms,
and thus provided exogenous variation in the tax burden of entrepreneurs.
We used as an outcome the turnover of the firm, that indicates whether the
output in the firm had increased or decreased as a result of the reforms.
The main result indicates that turnover increased 5% more in the treatment
group than in the control group. The elasticity of turnover with respect
to the marginal tax rate was -0.17. These main estimation results passed
various robustness checks, making them more credible.
The divided sample results revealed that the turnover of those firms whose
owner’s tax incentives changed more also responded more. Also those that
higher pre-reform income increased their firm’s turnover more. These results
imply that the stronger are the incentive, the greater is the response. This
result is in line with the finding in the elasticity of taxable income literature
that higher income individuals respond more to changes in tax incentives
(Gruber and Saez 2002 and Saez et al. 2012). The interpretation in this
literature is that the higher income individuals have more possibilities to
plan their tax payments, and also that larger changes in the tax code are
more salient.
The turnover result is encouraging for the interpretation that the effort
exerted by entrepreneurs had increased as a response to their reduced in-
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come tax burden. However, in general firms also use other inputs than en-
trepreneurial effort. Thus larger turnover (output) could result from greater
labour demand or investments. To pursue these hypothesis, we estimated
how the labour demand and investments developed as a response to the re-
forms. We did not find a robust statistically significant increase in these
variables. Furthermore, graphical inspection of the trends in the treatment
and control groups did not give a support to the hypothesis that the increase
in turnover had resulted from an increase in these visible inputs. All in all,
the only factor that remains to explain the turnover result is the greater ef-
fort exerted by an entrepreneur. Therefore the empirical results support the
possibility captured by our theoretical model that entrepreneurial effort does
respond to changes in entrepreneur’s taxation.
It seems that partnerships reacted to the tax incentives also by increas-
ing their profit margin, which is the income from the firm. However, we
did not have enough data to pursue this hypothesis further than graphical
presentation of the growth in the profits form partnerships over time. Also,
the wage sums increased among partnerships as a response to tax changes,
which leaves the possibility that entrepreneurs might have paid more wages
to themselves. These two figures together, increased profits and wage sums,
indicate that taxable income of the owner of the firm increased at least by as
much as the output of the firm. The response of the income from the firm to
the tax incentives points to the elasticity of taxable income, which is relevant
for deadweight loss calculations (Feldstein 1999 and Chetty 2009). Since the
income from the firm seems to increase about as much as output of the firm,
the elasticity could be a comparable figure, on the interval between -0.15 to
-0.4. Compared to findings in literature (see Saez et al. 2012 for discussion),
this range of taxable income elasticities is not overly large for entrepreneurs.
Another margin of responding is exit, entry and switching legal form.
These are extensive margin decisions, whereas marginally changing output is
an intensive margin decision. Previous literature studying the tax incentives
of small firms has focused quite a lot on this (Gordon and Mackie-Mason
1994, Gordon and Cullen 2007, Goolsbee 1998b). In the current study the
main estimation results we performed only for firms that continued in the
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sample from before to after the reform. Despite that, the reforms influenced
extensive margin behaviour in a statistically significant way. The reduced
income tax for income from firm influenced the decisions to switch legal
form; fewer firms switched from partnerships to corporations after the re-
form. Also exits among partnerships became less common and entry more
common phenomenon. This was expected since the reform made the taxa-
tion of partnerships more lenient relative to the pre-reform situation. It is
interesting how these extensive margin responses complete the picture what
happened as a result of the reform without hindering our intensive margin
results.
Our results suggest that the economic activity of entrepreneurs in their
firms can indeed be promoted by providing them better tax incentives. How-
ever, we interpret the elasticity of output with respect to income taxation,
-0.17, to be relatively small. As a result, it is possible that reducing the
tax burden in this way may prove to be a relatively costly way of increas-
ing firms’ output. This is supported by the relatively low taxable income
response. Our results indicate that intensive margin decisions are important
when analysing the response of entrepreneurs to tax incentives, in addition
to the extensive margin responses, which much of the earlier literature has
focused on analyzing.
References
[1] Bennmarker, H., Mellander, E and Öckert, B., 2009. Do regional payroll
tax reductions boost employment? Labour Economics 16 (2009).
[2] Boadway, R. and Bruce, N., 1984. A General Proposition on the Design
of a Neutral Business Tax. Journal of Public Economics 24.
[3] Buss, T., F., 2001. The Effect of State Tax Incentives on Economic
Growth and Firm Location Decisions: An Overview of the Literature.
Economic Development Quarterly 2001 15: 90.
36
[4] Carpenter, R. E. and Petersen, B. C., 2002. Is the growth of small firms
constrained by internal finance? Review of Economics and Statistics,
May 2002, 84(2).
[5] Carroll, R., Holtz-Eakin, D., Rider, M. and Rosen, H., S., 2001. Personal
Income Taxes and the Growth of Small Firms. Published in Poterba
(ed.), 2001. Tax Policy and the Economy, Volume 15, MIT Press.
[6] Chetty, R., 2009. Is the Taxable Income Elasticity Sufficient to Cal-
culate Deadweight Loss? The Implications of Evasion and Avoidance.
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 2009, 1:2, 31–52.
[7] Crawford, C. and Freedman, J., 2010. Small Business Taxation. in Mir-
rlees Review, Dimensions of Tax Design, Institute for Fiscal Studies,
Oxford University Press, 2010.
[8] Cullen, J., B. and Gordon, R., 2006. Tax Reform and Entrepreneurial
Activity. in Poterba (ed.), 2006: Tax Policy and the Economy, Volume
20, MIT Press.
[9] Cullen, J., B. and Gordon, R., 2007. Taxes and entrepreneurial risk-
taking: Theory and evidence for the U.S. Journal of Public Economics,
Volume 91, Issues 7–8, August 2007, Pages 1479–1505.
[10] Desai, M., A., Foley, C., F. and Hines, J., R., 2004. Foreign direct
investment in a world of multiple taxes. Journal of Public Economics 88
(2004).
[11] Duranton, G., Gobillon, L. and Overman, H., 2011. Assessing the effects
of local taxation using microgeographic data. The Economic Journal,
121 (September), 1017–1046.
[12] Feldstein, M., 1999. Tax Avoidance and the Deadweight Loss of the
Income Tax. The Review of Economics and Statistics, November 1999,
81(4): 674-680.
37
[13] Goolsbee, A.,1998a. Investment Tax Incentives, Prices, and the Supply
of Capital Goods. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 113, No. 1
(Feb., 1998).
[14] Goolsbee, A.,1998b. Taxes, organizational form, and the deadweight loss
of the corporate income tax. Journal of Public Economics 69 (1998).
[15] Goolsbee, A., 2004. The impact of the corporate income tax: evidence
from state organizational form data. Journal of Public Economics 88
(2004).
[16] Gordon, R. and Mackie-Mason, J., K., 1994. Tax distortions to the
choice of organizational form. Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 55, No.
2.
[17] Gruber, J. and Saez, E., 2002. The elasticity of taxable income: evidence
and implications. Journal of Public Economics 84 (2002) 1–32.
[18] HE 105/1996. Finnish Government proposal to the Finnish Par-
liament about changing the law regarding changing the tax law.
(In Finnish: Hallituksen esitys Eduskunnalle laeiksi tuloverolain
ja verotusmenettelystä annetun lain muuttamisesta), read from
http://www.edilex.fi/virallistieto/he/19960105 at 15 February 2012.
[19] ITL 1992. Income Tax Law 1535/1992. Read at 15 February 2012 from
http://www.finlex.fi/fi/laki/alkup/1992/19921535.
[20] Kanniainen, V., Kari, S. an Ylä-Liedenpohja, J., 2007. Nordic dual in-
come taxation of entrepreneurs. International Tax and Public Finance
(2007) 14: 407–426.
[21] Kari, S., Rauhanen, T., and Kröger, O., 2008. Henkilöyhtiöiden vero-
tuksen investointi- ja työllistämiskannustimet. VATT Research Reports
49 (2008), Government Institute for Economic Research.
[22] Kerr, W. and Nanda, R., 2009. Democratizing entry: Banking deregula-
tions, financing constraints, and entrepreneurship. Journal of Financial
Economics 94 (2009) 124–149.
38
[23] Kopczuk, W., 2005. Tax bases, tax rates and the elasticity of reported
income. Journal of Public Economics 89 (2005) 2093–2119.
[24] Korkeamäki, O. and Uusitalo, R., 2009. Employment and wage effects of
a payroll-tax - evidence from a regional experiment. International Tax
and Public Finance (2009) 16.
[25] Lindhe, T., Södersten, J. and Öberg, A., 2004. Economic Effects of
Taxing Different Organizational Forms under the Nordic Dual Income
Tax. International Tax and Public Finance, 11, 469–485, 2004.
[26] Mackie-Mason, J., K. and Gordon, R., 1997. How Much Do Taxes Dis-
courage Incorporation? The Journal of Finance, Vol. 52, No. 2 (Jun.,
1997), pp. 477-505.
[27] Nielsen, S., B. and Sorensen, P., B., 1997. On the optimality of the
Nordic system of dual income taxation. Journal of Public Economics 63
(1997) 311-329.
[28] Pirttilä, J. and Selin, H., 2001. Income Shifting within a Dual Income
Tax System: Evidence from the Finnish Tax Reform of 1993. Scandina-
vian Journal of Economics, Volume 113, Issue 1.
[29] Saez, E., 2003. The effect of marginal tax rates on income: a panel study
of ‘bracket creep’. Journal of Public Economics 87 (2003) 1231–1258.
[30] Saez, E., Slemrod, J. and Giertz, S., 2012. The Elasticity of Taxable
Income with Respect to Marginal Tax Rates: A Critical Review. Journal
of Economic Literature 2012, 50:1, 3–50.
[31] Sivadasan, J. and Slemrod, J., 2008. Tax law changes, income-shifting
and measured wage inequality: Evidence from India. Journal of Public
Economics 92 (2008) 2199–2224.
39
Appendix A: First-order conditions and Cramer’s
rule derivations
This appendix presents the derivation of the main theoretical results. We
start by presenting the derivation of the first-order and second-order condi-
tions. Then we present how changing the tax parameter µ affect the opti-
mized endogenous variables.
Take the inter-temporal objective function of an entrepreneur:
U = u1 (ne1 −m− T1 (ne1 −m,m)−R) + h(e1)
+ δu2 (Y +m− T2 (Y +m,m) + rR + A)
Next we take the first-order conditions with respect to e1, R and m:
∂U
∂e1
= u1cn (1− T1y) + he = 0 (4)
∂U
∂R
= −u1c + δu2cr = 0 (5)
∂U
∂m
= −u1c(1− T1y − T1m) +
δu2c (1− T2y − T2m) = 0 (6)
We take the second-order conditions form the first-order conditions
∂2U
∂e1∂e1
= −u1cn2T1yy + u1cc (n (1− T1y))2 + hee < 0
∂2U
∂e1∂m
= ∂
2U
∂m∂e1
= −u1cc (n (1− T1y)) (1− T1y − T1m) + u1cnT1yy > 0
∂2U
∂R∂R
= u1cc + δu2ccr2 < 0
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∂2U
∂e1∂R
= ∂
2U
∂R∂e1
= −u1ccn (1− T1y) > 0
∂2U
∂m∂m
= u1cc(1−T1y−T1m)2+δu2cc(1−T2y−T2m)2+u1c (−T1yy)+δu2c (−T2yy) < 0
∂2U
∂R∂m
= ∂
2U
∂m∂R
= u1cc (1− T1y − T1m) + δru2cc(1− T2y − T2m) < 0
The sign of the determinant H must be negative for the second-order
conditions of this model to be fulfilled
H =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∂2U
∂e1∂e1
∂2U
∂e1∂R
∂2U
∂e1∂m
∂2U
∂R∂e1
∂2U
∂R∂R
∂2U
∂R∂m
∂2U
∂m∂e1
∂2U
∂m∂R
∂2U
∂m∂m
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
We insert into the second-order conditions the arbitrage condition derived
from the first-order conditions that r (1− T1y − T1m) = 1 − T2y − T2m. For
example developing by the first term of the determinant, we have ∂2U
∂e1∂e1
,
which is negative multiplied by square determinant as follows:
∂2U
∂R∂R
∂2U
∂m∂m
− ∂
2U
∂R∂m
∂2U
∂m∂R
= (1− T1y − T1m)2
(
u1cc + δu2ccr2
)(
u1cc + δu2ccr2 − 1(1− T1y − T1m)2
(u1cT1yy + δu2cT2yy)
)
− (1− T1y + T1m)2
(
u1cc + δu2ccr2
)2
> 0
Developing all the terms in similar fashion as above, we get the following
signs for the terms of the determinant H:
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H =
∂2U
∂e1∂e1︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∂2U
∂R∂R
∂2U
∂R∂m
∂2U
∂m∂R
∂2U
∂m∂m
∣∣∣∣∣∣︸ ︷︷ ︸
+ −
∂2U
∂R∂e1︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∂2U
∂e1∂R
∂2U
∂e1∂m
∂2U
∂m∂R
∂2U
∂m∂m
∣∣∣∣∣∣︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
+
∂2U
∂m∂e1︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∂2U
∂e1∂R
∂2U
∂e1∂m
∂2U
∂R∂R
∂2U
∂R∂m
∣∣∣∣∣∣︸ ︷︷ ︸
+ < 0
The sign of the H determinant is negative, and the second-order condi-
tions fulfilled, as long as the following condition is fulfilled from the second
square determinant (
1 + 1
r
T2yy
T1yy
)
(1− T1y)
(1− T1y − T1m) < 1 + δr
2u2cc
u1cc
In this case the first two terms in H determinant in the first line above
dominate the second square determinant. Since the first line is negative
when the condition stated above holds, the whole H determinant is negative
and the second-order condition holds.
We next derive the effect the parameter µ in the model have on the
optimum values of the endogenous choice variables using Cramer’s rule. Take
first the derivative with respect of µ from the first-order conditions for R and
m in equations (5) and (6).
URµ = u1ccT1µ − δu2ccrT2µ
Umµ = u1ccT1µ (1− T1y − T1m)− δ (u2cc (1− T2y − T2m)T2µ)
Here we assume that Tym, Tmm = 0 and Tm < 0, transferring income
within firm (m) affects the tax function in a negative and linear way. Utilizing
a condition from FOC it follows that URµ (1− T1y − T1m) = (1− T1y − T1m) (u1ccT1µ − δu2ccrT2µ) =
Umµ. The effect of a change in µ on optimal effort is:
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∂e∗1
∂µ
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 ∂2U
∂e1∂R
∂2U
∂e1∂m
−URµ ∂2U∂R∂R ∂
2U
∂R∂m
−Umµ ∂2U∂m∂R ∂
2U
∂m∂m
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
H
∂e∗1
∂µ
= URµ
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∂2U
∂e1∂R
∂2U
∂e1∂m
∂2U
∂m∂R
∂2U
∂m∂m
∣∣∣∣∣∣− Umµ
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∂2U
∂e1∂R
∂2U
∂e1∂m
∂2U
∂R∂R
∂2U
∂R∂m
∣∣∣∣∣∣
This complicated calculation is manipulated into:
(u1ccT1µ − δu2ccrT2µ)
∗
(
u1cc (1− T1y)
(
T1yy + 1rT2yy
))
(1− T1y − T1m)
where the second line is always negative. Thus the effect of the special tax
rule on effort is determined by the first line above. Therefore the effect is
positive as long as
∂e∗1
∂µ
≷ 0⇐⇒ T1µ
T2µ
≷ δru2cc
u1cc
A similar calculation is performed for m. Cramer’s rule produces the
following determinant, the sign of which has to be determined:
∂m∗
∂µ
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∂2U
∂e1∂e1
∂2U
∂e1∂R
0
∂2U
∂R∂e1
∂2U
∂R∂R
−URµ
∂2U
∂m∂e1
∂2U
∂m∂R
−Umµ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
H
∂m∗
∂µ
= URµ
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∂2U
∂e1∂e1
∂2U
∂e1∂R
∂2U
∂m∂e1
∂2U
∂m∂R
∣∣∣∣∣∣− Umµ
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∂2U
∂e1∂e1
∂2U
∂e1∂R
∂2U
∂R∂e1
∂2U
∂R∂R
∣∣∣∣∣∣
The effect of the special tax rule on m∗ turns out to depend on the same
condition as for e∗:
∂m∗
∂µ
≷ 0⇐⇒ T1µ
T2µ
≷ δru2cc
u1cc
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Appendix B: Figures and tables
This appendix presents additional tables and figures to the main text.
Statistics Rents Inputs Fixed expenses
Mean 6180 144692 3425
Median 1009 29113 0
SD 16446 471532 17960
N 68514 68514 68514
Table B1: Control variables for partnerships
For sole proprietors, the reforms did not change tax burden significantly.
The left panel of figure B1 presents the change in MTRs for sole proprietors
due to the reforms. A large share of them is at zero and the bulk of the data
is inside one per cent change in absolute value. The right panel of the figure
presents the proportional change in the main outcome for sole proprietors
and compares that with corporations. Firstly it is evident that there is no
clear deviation from the general trend for sole proprietors at the time of
the reform. Secondly, the pre-reform trends between the two groups do not
resemble each other. Thus the common trends assumption required for a
natural experiment analysis in not fulfilled. For these reasons we exclude the
sole proprietors from the analysis, although the reform in principle applied
to them as well.
44
0
10
20
30
%
-.03 -.02 -.01 0 .01 .02 .03
Change in MTR
-
.
05
0
.
05
.
1
.
15
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Year
Corporations Sole proprietors
Change in growth rate of turnover
Sole proprietors
Figure B1: Sole proprietors: Changes in marginal tax rates and change in
mean of growth of corporations and sole proprietors
45
-
.
1
-
.
05
0
.
05
.
1
.
15
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Year
Large decrease in MTR
-
.
1
-
.
05
0
.
05
.
1
.
15
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Year
Small decrease in MTR
Divided by median proportional MTR change in 1997
Corporations Partnerships
Average proportional change in MTR
Figure B2: Divided sample description by the size of change in tax incentives
Note: Figure compares proportional change in MTRs and the development of turnover according to the pre-reform size of
MTR .
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Figure B4: Profits from partnerships
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Figure B5: Mean values of the main outcome variables over time for part-
nerships and corporations
Note: Figure compares the mean of proportional change in profits, wage sums, investments and number of employees.
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